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I. INTRODUCTION

The 2003 recall movement in California, which culminated in the
removal of Governor Gray Davis from office and his replacement with
Hollywood action-hero Arnold Schwarzenegger, is a bizarre twist in U.S.
politics that raises some thorny political and legal questions. I By
following the procedures set forth in the California Constitution 2 and the
California Elections Code,3 a group of California voters discontent with
Davis's governorship successfully removed him from office and replaced
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Moore, the firm of Stritmatter Kessler Whelan Withey Coluccio, and the 2004-05 Seattle University
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1. On October 7, 2003, voters approved the recall of Governor Davis and elected Arnold
Schwarzenegger as Davis's replacement. The election results are as follows:
Shall GRAY DAVIS be recalled (removed) from the office of Governor?
Yes
4,976,274 (55.4%)
No
4,007,783 (44.6%)
Leading Candidates to succeed GRAY DAVIS as Governor if he is recalled:
Arnold Schwarzenegger (Rep.) 4,206,284 (48.6%)
Cruz M. Bustamante (Dem.)
2,724,874 (31.5%)
Tom McClintock (Rep.)
1,161,287 (13.5%)
CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE KEVIN SHELLEY: ELECTION RESULTS AND DATES (2003), at
http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/elections-elections.htm (last visited July 10, 2004) [hereinafter
ELECTION RESULTS].

2. CAL. CONST. art. II, §§ 13-19 (1976).

3. CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 11000-11386 (West 1996).
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him with a candidate with no political experience but broad popular
appeal and independent wealth.4
The potential for political chaos resulting from the California recall
did not go unnoticed by California voters 5 and gave rise to broad,
statewide support for reform of the recall system. 6 California voters
realized what was apparent to many onlookers: The recall significantly
disrupted the political system in California and stalled the normal
functioning of the government. The recall election forced Governor
Davis to campaign relentlessly to maintain his job and distracted him
from his constitutionally prescribed duties as the chief executive of
California. While it is too soon to determine whether anything positive,
such as a revitalization of the California economy, will come out of this
drastic recall measure, it is unlikely that California's political system will
be able to withstand similar disruptions in the future. Thus, California's
recall system must be reformed.
Many states have mechanisms to recall statewide elected officials,
but these recall systems do a better job of minimizing the potential for
political chaos than does the California system. In comparing the recall
schemes of Washington State and California, for example, it is apparent
that the California recall mechanism suffers from constitutional defects
4. Before the recall election, Schwarzenegger's assets were estimated at more than $68 million.
Lance Williams, FINANCES: Actor's First Disclosure of Money Muscle, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 10,
2003,
available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f-/chronicle/archive/2003/08/l 0/
ARNOLD.TMP (last visited July 10, 2004). The most recent two installments of Schwarzenegger's

"Terminator" franchise, Terminator 2: Judgment Day and Terminator 3: Rise of the Machines, have
together grossed almost a billion dollars worldwide in box office sales. The Top 200 Highest
GrossingMovies ofAll-time (Worldwide), at http://www.einsiders.com/gross/top I 50-world.php (last
updated July 10, 2004).
5. See, e.g., With New Ads, California Recall Takes Nasty Turn (Sept. 24, 2003), at

http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/09/24//judy.desk.recall/
(last
visited
July 2004)
("Meanwhile, the group Californians Against the Costly Recall released its own ad with a grim
warning: 'Whoever takes over, the bad feelings and political chaos may get even worse."'); Jake
Tapper, Recall the Recaller? Calif Democrat Raises Possibilityof a Retaliatory Bid (Aug. 4, 2003),
at
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/wnt/Politics/

calif recall030804.html (last visited July 10, 2004) ("Some believe California's turmoil may not be
over in October, and the rest of the country shouldn't necessarily greet the current and future
California chaos with bemusement.").
6. According to a poll conducted by the San Francisco Chronicle, approximately sixty percent
of California voters believe that the recall process, while a valuable tool, should only be used when
there is an illegal or unethical activity by an elected official, and most voters polled believed that
there should be stricter petitioning requirements in the recall process. Linda Gledhill, Most Voters
Support Changing Recall Steps, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 16, 2003, available at http://www.sfgate.com/
cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2003/l0/16/MNGBH2CATDI.DTL (last visited July 10,
2004).
7. See John Canalis, Ex-Governors Weigh in on Recall, Pasadena Star News, Aug. 25, 2003,
available at http://www.pasadenastamews.com/Stories/0,1413,206%257E25101 %257E 1591525,00.

html (last visited July 10, 2004).
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and unnecessarily exposes elected officials to political harassment. The
most notable constitutional defect California's recall mechanism has is
the signature-gathering requirement, which discriminates against nonregistered voters, and thus violates the First Amendment. Since revision
is necessary to remedy this constitutional defect and to fulfill the
demands of California voters, 8 California legislators should begin such
legislative efforts.
In order to meet California voters' demand that recall be available
only when an elected official has engaged in illegal or unethical
conduct, 9 California legislators should fashion their new recall system
after the one used in Washington State. Washington's recall model not
only does not suffer from the constitutional defects of the California
provisions, but also more adequately balances the need to protect elected
officials from harassment and the desire to give the citizens of a state
some direct influence over their elected officials. California legislators
should thus work to create this kind of balance by amending its flawed
recall process to mimic Washington's effective recall system.
This article highlights the weaknesses of the electoral recall
mechanisms in California and the way in which the Washington recall
process has avoided such weaknesses. Part II provides general
background information on the development of recall mechanisms. Part
III explores how the United States Supreme Court has ruled on recall
attempts and the specific guidance the Court has provided for states in
developing adequately protective recall processes. Part IV analyzes the
strengths and weaknesses of the California recall provisions by
examining the recall-related opinions of California courts and the
complexities of Governor Davis's recall. Part V provides a solution to
the California dilemma by exploring an alternative form of recall
established in Washington, examines both the constitutional and
statutory provisions of Washington's recall mechanism, and analyzes
Washington courts' interpretation of these provisions. After comparing
the two recall regimes, Part V argues that the Washington mechanism is
superior to California's process. Finally, Part VI urges California
legislators to promote the true purposes of recall by ensuring government
accountability and public participation while minimizing the risks of
hindering the government functioning that such harassment of elected
officials tends to elicit.

8. Gledhill, supra note 6.
9. Id.
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11. BACKGROUND

A. The Populism Movement Led to the Adoption of the Recall, the
Initiative, and the Referendum by Many States.
The movement for recall in the United States was fueled by
concerns similar to those that served as the impetus for the initiative and
referendum in many states: a fear that state governments were no longer
accountable to the people.'0 The Populist and Progressive movements at
the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth
century created these mechanisms of direct democracy." The adoption of
these procedures was founded on the principle that elected officials are
merely agents of the people and, accordingly, the people should have the
power at all times to control their agents' activities. 12 This increased
desire for popular controls over government came about because of
widespread corruption and election fraud during that period. 13 Thus,
initiative and referendum procedures were specifically adopted as a way
of allowing the people direct influence over the laws that governed
15
them.' 4 Similarly, in light of the growing distrust of elected officials,
recall provisions gave the people the ability to keep their decisionmakers
on close leashes, thereby promoting the accountability of representative
government. 16
Although early twentieth century efforts at direct democracy came
about to increase public control over elected officials, these measures
have also been seen as a way to increase public participation in
10. CHARLES A. BEARD & BIRL E. SHULTZ, DOCUMENTS ON THE STATEWIDE INITIATIVE,
REFERENDUM AND RECALL 52 (1970).
11. Id.; see generally, LAURA TALLIAN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF
THE INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM AND RECALL PROCESS (1977) (history of Populism movement).

12. BEARD, supra note 10.
13. INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL: DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES,
Major Studies and Issue Briefs of the Congressional Research Service, CRS-1, 1992 Supp., No. 91752-GOV (Univ. Publications of Am.) (hereinafter INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL).
14. BEARD, supra note 10, at 22; see also INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL at CRS-lCRS-2:
Initiative is the process by which voters propose and enact laws or constitutional amendments,
independent of legislatures. A requisite number of voters sign petitions for an initiative to be
placed on the ballot. If a majority of voters approve the initiative at a statewide level, it is
enacted. Most states prohibit initiatives on certain issues. Referendum provides a mechanism
by which voters may approve or disapprove of statutes which have already been enacted.
Referenda fall into three categories: citizen petition to approve or disapprove statutes enacted
by the state legislature; voluntary referral of a law by the legislature; and referral of certain
questions to voters as required in state constitutions. Procedurals for referendum by citizen
procedure are similar to those for initiatives.
Id.
15. INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL at CRS-1.
16. See BEARD, supra note 10, at 52.
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government. 17 During the twentieth century, voter turnout on a national
level decreased substantially.' 8 Allowing the public to exert more direct
control over government officials through recall elections may provide
voters with the sense that their vote is actually important. This
phenomenon was demonstrated in the recent California recall election, in
which voter turnout was significantly higher than in previous
9
gubernatorial elections.'
B. DirectDemocracy Has Been Misused
While electoral recall, initiative, and referendum are rooted in
policies of democratic principles such as public participation in
government and the accountability of elected officials, this type of public
power is not without its dangers. Because the electorate is not constituted
of only lawyers, politicians, and economists, the electorate may not
necessarily understand the delicate balance that keeps government
working. Therefore, direct democratic procedures create the possibility
that voters might blame their economic or other hardships on elected
officials who might not be responsible for their problems. Moreover,
while direct democracy can foster the ideals of populism, direct measures
also allow special interest groups to bypass legislative safeguards and
directly influence the public. 20 Just as the initiative and referendum
processes bypass the safeguards of the legislative system, 21 the
installation of new leaders through an electoral recall bypasses the
normal protections of a republican form of government. Essentially, a
recall regime with weak standards, such as California's, deteriorates an
elected official's ability to take actions that may have negative short-term
consequences but favorable long-term consequences. By having a term
of years secured without the threat of recall except for illegal or unethical
17. See, e.g., David B. Maglebe, Let the Voters Decide? An Assessment of the Initiative and
Referendum Process, 66 U. COLO, LAW REV. 13, 43 (1995).

18. According to the Federal Elections Commission, voter turnout in presidential elections has
been on a steady decline since the 1960s, from more than 62% in 1960 to barely more than 50% in
2000. FEDERAL ELECTIONS COMMISSION, ABOUT ELECTIONS AND VOTING, at http://www.fec.gov/

elections.html (last visited July 19, 2004).
19. In the 2003 recall election 61.20% of registered voters cast ballots. In contrast, in the 2002
general election in which Governor Davis was elected for his second term in office, only 50.57% of
registered voters cast ballots. ELECTION RESULTS, supra note 2.
20. Daniel M. Warner, Direct Democracy: The Right of the People to Make Fools of
Themselves; The Use and Abuse of Initiative and Referendum, A Local Government Perspective, 19

SEATTLE U. L. REV. 47, 86 (1995) (providing several examples of the misuse of the initiative and
referendum in Washington State); Sherman J. Clark, A Populist Critique of Direct Democracy, 112

HARV. L. REV. 434, 439 (1998) ("the absence of deliberation, low and uneven voter turnout, voter
ignorance, the influence of money, and special-interest capture all undermine the responsiveness of
direct democracy").
21. See Warner, supra note 20, at 88.
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acts, as in Washington, elected officials are better able to consider the
long-term effects of their policies.
C. The Histories of Recall in Californiaand Washington
Are Largely Identical.
1. California
In 1911, electoral recall was added to the California State
Constitution as Article XXIII, section 1.22 This was largely a response to
the dominance of railroad companies over California's economics and
politics. 23 As a result of public resentment of the railroads' control of

government, the Progressive candidate for governor, Hiram Johnson,
won the general election in 1910. 24 During this movement, the
Progressive Party stressed the importance of the provision in the 1849
and 1879 California State Constitutions that "[a]ll political power is
inherent in the people.", 25 The Progressive position was that "direct
democracy" would allow the public to act as a check on the power of the
legislature and special interests 26 and ensure that the public's "inherent"
power is not usurped. Governor Johnson expressed specific interest in
direct democratic processes such as the initiative, the referendum, and
the recall. 27 In tandem with the Progressive majority in the legislature,
Governor Johnson proposed the constitutional amendments that created
the initiative, referendum, and recall procedures, which were adopted by
voters on October 10, 1911.28

Until its repeal and codification in the California Elections Code in
1970, the recall amendment remained largely unchanged. 29 After
codification, the remaining provisions were renumbered as Article II,
sections 13 to 19, and adopted in 1976.30 This codification arose from a
22. JOSEPH R. GRODIN ET AL., THE CALIFORNIA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE
75 (1993).

23. Id. at 16-17.
24. Id. at 17.
25.
26.
27.
28.

CAL. CONST. art. I,§ 2 (repealed 1980); GRODIN, supra note 22, at 17.
GRODIN, supra note 22, at 17.
Id.
Id. at 17-18.

29. Id. at 75.
30. This was accomplished through the passage of California Proposition 9, in 1974.
Proponents of this revision argued that a "YES vote on Proposition 9 will apply the people's right to
recall public officials more uniformly and will clarify the signature-gathering process. Itwill also
eliminate inequities in the existing 'grace period,' which is the time between an officer's election
and the time when a recall drive may begin." California Voter's Pamphlet, General Election
November 5, 1974, available at http://holmes.uchastings.edu/ballot pdf/1974g.pdf (last visited July
10, 2004).
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1959 study recommending that the constitution be entirely revised to
make it more streamlined. 3 1 During this reorganization, although most of
the provisions were simply renumbered, some substantive changes were
made to the recall procedures. 32 Most importantly, recall was expanded

to include officers of county boards of education33 and normalization of
recall procedures for statewide and local officials.
2. Washington
The recall provisions in Washington were adopted in response to
many of the same pressures that spawned the recall movement in
California. In the 1880s, significant railroad construction took place in
Washington, spurring major population growth in the region. 34
Resentment at railroads and other large corporations grew because of
their monopolistic practices, political abuses, and a belief that
corporations had too much influence over legislators and government
officials. 3 As in California, this distrust manifested itself by the
development of the Populist Movement, which established its own
political party shortly after Washington gained statehood.3 6 The Populist
philosophy was based on distrust of legislatures and corporate influence
in government and a belief that direct democracy was a way to combat
corruption. 37 The Populists elected to office succeeded in adopting a
number of direct democracy provisions in the state constitution,
38
including the initiative, the referendum, and the recall.
D. Californiaand Washington Are Not Alone in
Adopting Recall Measures.
Eighteen states, the District of Columbia, 39 and Guam 4 have
adopted statewide recall procedures and thirty-six states have allowed

31. Before these revisions, the California Constitution was ten times longer than the federal
constitution, and was the second longest state constitution. GRODIN, supra note 22, at 19.
32. See THE LAW OF POLITICS: FEDERAL & CALIFORNIA FAIR POLITICAL PRACTICES &

ELECTION LAWS 371 (Thomas G. Reddy, ed., 1978) (hereinafter LAW OF POLITICS).
33. Id. at 97-99.
34. Between 1880 and 1890 the population of the territory to become Washington State grew
from 75,000 people to around 350,000. ROBERT F. UTTER & HUGH D. SPITZER, THE WASHINGTON
STATE CONSITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 11 (2002).

35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 12.
38. Id.
39. Jennie Bowser, Recall of State Officials, National Conference of State Legislatures, at
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legman/elect/recallprovision.htm (last modified June 23, 2003).

40. See Gutierrez v. Ada, 528 U.S. 250 (2000).
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electoral recall in local jurisdictions. 4 1 Despite these numbers, there have
only been two successful recalls of governors to date.42 All recall
provisions share three elements. First, all require a petition signed by a
certain number of voters to start the recall process.4 3 For a statewide
recall, this percentage varies from 10 percent in Montana to 33.3 percent
in Louisiana.44 Second, all have some type of certification or review of
the sufficiency of the recall petition.45 Review standards vary among
states, from merely procedural requirements in California, to a review of
the sufficiency of the charges in Washington. Finally, all require the
election or appointment of a successor to the now-vacant office.4 6
States use three different methods to appoint a successor. 47 The

most well-known method-adopted in California-conducts the recall
election and the election for the replacement official simultaneously.48
The second method conducts the recall election first, and if the recall is
successful, then conducts a separate election for the successor. 49 The
third method appoints a successor after a statewide official has been
recalled. 50 This third method, used in Washington, minimizes the
potential for a recall to deteriorate into a California-style popularity
contest.5'

41. Bowser, supra note 39. There are state-wide recall provisions in the following states:
Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota,
Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, Washington, and Wisconsin.
42. The first recall of a governor was in 1921 when North Dakota voters successfully recalled
Governor Lynn J. Frazier. The second was in 2003 when California voters successfully recalled
Governor Gray Davis. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. California requires only 12 percent, while Washington requires 25 percent.
45. See id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Other states that have adopted this method are Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, North Dakota,
and Wisconsin. Id.
49. States that have adopted this method are: Georgia, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota,
Montana, New Jersey, Oregon, and Rhode Island. Id.
50. States adopting this method are: Alaska, Idaho, Kansas, and Washington. Id.
51. See, e.g., Gene Sperling, In California, All Votes Not Created Equal (Sept. 12, 2003) at
=
http://quote.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid I0000039&sid=aVNRYkj34NLM&refer-columnist sp
erling (last visited July 10, 2004) ("This worrying outcome posed by the California [recall] law
could set a particularly damaging precedent when states are facing harsh budget deficits. Let's face
it, no one likes the painful choices to close a deficit, whether they are tax increases, spending cuts or
some mix of the two. Deficit reduction is often about finding the least bad of very unpopular and
ugly fiscal choices. The crucial test shouldn't be whether a governor's tough choices lose a
popularity contest, but whether there is a viable alternative that more people support.").
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THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ON RECALL

Although the Supreme Court has not focused significant attention
on electoral recall, it has recognized the validity of the recall process. A
few opinions shed some light on the Court's position on the validity of
various states' recall processes and on policy considerations that should
be taken into account when analyzing the sufficiency of any recall
mechanism. The following subsections outline U.S. Supreme Court cases
dealing with electoral recall issues and highlight the most important
policies the Court has considered when examining the validity of direct
democracy mechanisms.
A. The Court Recognizes the Validity of Recall.
The mere fact that the Supreme Court has ruled on recall issues
implicitly condones the use of recall by the states. For example, in
Republican Party of Hawaii v. Mink,52 Justice Rehnquist considered an
emergency appeal by appellants, two recalled Honolulu city council
members who had lost a local recall election.5 3 Appellants sought to run
54
in the special election to fill the vacancies caused by their own recall.
Appellants argued that the Court should either order a stay of the order
by the Supreme Court of Hawaii preventing them from running, or enjoin
the conduct of appellee, the city clerk of Honolulu, from refusing to put
appellants' names on the recall ballot. 55 Appellants' theory was that the
recall provisions of the Honolulu City Charter violated the federal
constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Anderson v.
Celebrezze. 56 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the ordinance was
unconstitutional, but the Supreme Court of Hawaii, adopting a narrow
interpretation of the ordinance to avoid the constitutional problems,

52. 474 U.S. 1301 (1985) (Rehnquist, C.J.).
53. Hawaii is one of the states that allows for recall of local elected officials, but does not have
a statewide electoral recall process.
54. Mink, 474 U.S. at 1302.
55. Id. at 1301, 1302.
56. 460 U.S. 780 (1983). Anderson involved an Ohio law requiring an independent candidate
for President to file a statement of candidacy eight months before the election in order to appear on
the ballot. Id. at 780. The Anderson Court held that the Ohio law burdened "the right of individuals
to associate for the advancement of political beliefs, and the right of qualified voters ... to cast their
votes effectively." Id. at 787. Finding this burden to "unquestionably outweigh the State's minimal
interest in imposing a March deadline," the Anderson Court invalidated the Ohio statute. Id. at 806.
In Mink, petitioners argued that the Honolulu City Charter, requiring that "[n]o person, who has been
removed from his elected office or who has resigned from such an office after a recall petition
directed to him has been filed, shall be eligible for election or appointment to any office of the city
within two years after his removal or resignation," was unconstitutional under Anderson. 474 U.S. at
1301-02.
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refused to allow appellants to run in the election. 5 Although not
providing much reasoning in this emergency appeal, Rehnquist stated
that the "City Charter provision as interpreted by the Supreme Court of
Hawaii is not, in my judgment, clearly unconstitutional . . . these
circumstances . . . and the usual presumption of constitutionality
58
accorded to the state and local laws lead me to deny the application."
Thus, the validity of the general concept of recall was acknowledged by
the Supreme Court.
Similarly, the United States Supreme Court directly addressed
electoral recall procedures in Gutierrez v. Ada. 59 A federal statute
required that the election of the Governor and Lieutenant Governor of
Guam receive a majority of votes to prevent a run-off election. 60
Respondents argued that the Guam Election Commission had improperly
discounted the ballots that were left blank in determining that Gutierrez
had gathered the required majority of votes.61 The Court noted that
requiring a majority of the total number of voters on Election Day would
be in tension with the provisions that provide for recall elections of the
Governor and Lieutenant Governor. 62 The recall provision looked to the
total number of persons who actually voted for Governor, not to the total
number of people who cast ballots. 63 The Court pronounced that "[i]n a
rational world, we would not expect the vote required to oust a Governor
64
to be pegged to a lower number than it would take to elect one."
Mink and Gutierrez demonstrate that the Supreme Court accepts the
general idea of electoral recall as long as the recall provisions are
adopted in such a way to avoid conflict with the Constitution. The Court
is understandably reluctant to interfere with procedures adopted by the
states to promote democratic principles; however, close examination of
Supreme Court cases dealing with other forms of direct democracy and
the constitutional separation-of-powers doctrine sheds some light on the
type of recall challenges the Court may consider.

57. Mink, 474 U.S. at 1302.

58. Id.
59. 528 U.S. 250 (2000).
60. Id. at 252-53 (citing 48 U.S.C. § 1442).
61. Id. at 253.
62. Id. at 257; 48 U.S.C. § 1422a(b) ("Any Governor, Lieutenant Governor, or member of the
legislature of Guam may be removed from office by a referendum election in which at least twothirds of the number of persons voting for such official in the last preceding general election at
which such official was elected vote in favor of recall and in which those so voting constitute a
majority of all those participating in such referendum election.").
63. Gutierrez, 528 U.S. at 257.

64. Id.
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B. The Supreme Court Has FoundCertain DirectDemocracy
Provisions to Be Unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court's recent ruling on the constitutionality of
Colorado's initiative process is especially relevant in determining the
constitutionality of the California recall scheme. In Buckley v. American
Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc. ,65 the Court held that part of the
Colorado statute governing initiative petitions was unconstitutional. 66
The Colorado initiative process placed three conditions on initiative
petition circulators: 1) they must be registered voters in Colorado; 2)
they must wear a badge for identification; and 3) paid signature gatherers
must have their names, addresses, and salaries published. 67 In its
reasoning, the Court recognized that "[s]tates allowing ballot initiatives
have considerable leeway to protect the integrity and reliability of the
initiative process, as they have with respect to election processes
generally., 68 Despite this general deference to the States, the Court found
that petition circulation is "core political speech because it involves
interactive communication concerning political change," and that "First
Amendment protection for such interaction . . . is at its zenith." 69
Accordingly, the Court found Colorado's justifications for its limitations
inadequate 70 and ruled that all three restrictions on the signaturegathering process violated the First Amendment.
The Buckley case provides insight into the Court's approach toward
dealing with the states' adoption of direct democracy procedures. Most
important is the Buckley Court's treatment of the voter registration
requirement for initiative petition circulators, because some states, such
as California, have put similar restrictions on their recall procedures. 72
The Court recognized that voter registration may be easy and thus not a
73
substantial obstacle to participating in the initiative process.
Nevertheless, the Court believed that the choice not to register to vote

65. 525 U.S. 182 (1999).

66. Id. at 187.
67. Id. at 186 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 1-40-112(l)-(2), 121 (1998)).
68. Id. at 191; see also Biddulph v. Mortham, 89 F.3d 1491, 1494, 1500-01 (11 th Cir. 1996)
(upholding initiative proposals to amend the Florida Constitution); Taxpayers United for Assessment

Cuts v. Austin, 994 F.2d 291, 293-94, 296-97 (6th Cir. 1993) (upholding Michigan procedures for
signature gathering in the initiative process).
69. Buckley, 525 U.S. at 186-87 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).

70. Gale Norton, representing petitioners, argued that the laws were justified by Colorado's
strong interest in policing petition circulators who engaged in misconduct, as well as putting a check
on the domination of the initiative process by special interest groups. Buckley, 525 U.S. at 196, 198,

202.
71. Buckley, 525 U.S. at 187.
72. See infra Part I.CI.
73. Buckley, 525 U.S. at 195.
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"implicates political thought and expression," and that a "refusal to
register is a 'form of. . . private and public protest."'' 74 For this reason,
Colorado's signature-gathering requirements violated the First
Amendment.7 5 By requiring signature gatherers to be registered voters,
the California recall procedures also violate the principle that silence in
the electoral process is a form of political speech protected by the First
Amendment.
C. The Supreme Court Has Provided Guidance on Policy Considerations
Relevant to a State's Recall Mechanism.
Beyond the technical issues on the constitutionality of electoral
laws in cases like Buckley, the Supreme Court has provided some insight
into policy considerations that should be accounted for in devising-or in
California's case, revising-recall mechanisms. These cases deal with
separation-of-powers issues and concerns with harassment and
interference with the duties of elected officials. This guidance should be
used by legislators in determining how to strike a balance between
promoting the purposes of recall and the effects that recall can have on
elected officials and government functioning.
The most notable case is Clinton v. Jones,7 6 in which the Supreme
Court considered when judicial interference with the duties of the
executive branch is appropriate. 77 Paula Jones alleged a deprivation of
federal civil rights, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
defamation against President Clinton arising from an incident that
occurred when Clinton was Governor of Arkansas.78 President Clinton
argued that the civil suit should be postponed on the basis of presidential
immunity because "unless immunity is available, the threat of judicial
interference with the Executive Branch through scheduling orders,
potential contempt citations, and sanctions would violate separation-ofpowers principles." '9While it ultimately disagreed with President
g!
Clinton,80 the Court did concentrate on the separation-of-powers issue.
The Clinton decision should serve as a guidepost for legislators to
determine what types of protections to afford elected officials to
counterbalance the potentially damaging consequences to government
74. Id. at 195-96 (quoting testimony of William Orr, executive director of the American
Constitutional Law Foundation).
75. Id. at 186.
76. 520 U.S. 681 (1997).

77. See id. at 690.
78. Id. at 685.
79. Id. at 688.
80. Id. at 705-06.
81. Id.
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that are posed by recall. Clinton stood for the idea that the President was
not entitled to temporary immunity from suits arising out of unofficial
acts, and that "the doctrine of separation of powers does not require
federal courts to stay all private actions against the President until he
leaves office.'' 82 The Court reasoned, in part, that while presidential
duties are mandated by Article II, section I of the U.S. Constitution,83 the
risk that such suits will "generate a large volume of politically motivated
harassing and frivolous litigation" is not serious because "[m]ost
frivolous and vexatious litigation is terminated at the pleading stage or
on summary judgment, with little if any personal involvement by the
defendant.", 84 The Court also noted the availability of sanctions as a
deterrent to bringing harassing or politically motivated litigation against
the Chief Executive. 85 In finding little risk that the suits would
substantially interfere with President Clinton's ability to carry out his
Article II duties, the Court denied the motion to dismiss on the grounds
86
of presidential immunity.
Other cases have similarly highlighted the Supreme Court's
concern with laws that have the potential to interfere with the duties of
executive officials. For example, Barr v. Matteo is an older case that,
along with Clinton, could serve as a guide for balancing the public policy
considerations related to recall. 87 In Barr, former employees brought a
libel suit against officers of the Office of Rent Stabilization. 88 In
considering whether the officers should be granted immunity, the Court
found that it needed to
weigh ...two considerations of high importance ...on the one
hand, the protection of the individual citizen against pecuniary
damage caused by oppressive or malicious action on the part of
officials of the Federal Government; and on the other, the protection
of the public interest by shielding responsible governmental officers
against the harassment and inevitable hazards of vindictive or illfounded damage suits brought on account
of action taken in the
89
exercise of their official responsibilities:
In weighing these considerations, the Court recognized that suits
against executive officers "inhibit the fearless, vigorous, and effective

82. Id.

83. Id. at 699 n.29.
84. Id. at 708.
85. Id. at 708-09.
86. Id. at 710.
87. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).

88. Id. at 565.
89. Id.
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administration of policies of government" 90 and thus upheld the
executive immunity of the officers acting in their official duty even if
their actions were "within the outer perimeter of petitioner's line of
duty." 9 1 The Court expanded on this delicate balancing
by quoting Judge
92
Learned Hand's decision in Gregoirev. Biddle:
It does indeed go without saying that an official, who is in fact
guilty of using his powers to vent his spleen upon others, or for any
other personal motive not connected with the public good, should
not escape liability for the injuries he may so cause; and, if it were
possible in practice to confine such complaints to the guilty, it
would be monstrous to deny recovery. The justification for doing so
is that it is impossible to know whether the claim is well founded
until the case has been tried, and that to submit all officials, the
innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of a trial and to the
inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but
the most resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching
discharge of their duties. Again and again the public interest calls
for action which may turn out to be founded on a mistake, in the
face of which an official may later find himself hard put to it to
satisfy a jury of his good faith. There must indeed be means of
punishing public officers who have been truant to their duties; but
that is quite another matter from exposing such as have been
honestly mistaken to suit by anyone who has suffered from their
errors. As is so often the case, the answer must be found in a
balance between the evils inevitable in either alternative. In this
instance it has been thought in the end better to leave unredressed
the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try
to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation....

These policy considerations raised by Judge Hand ring just as true in the
context of electoral recall. Decisionmakers must weigh the same factors
when determining whether a civil suit against an executive official may
proceed as when determining if a recall petition can be certified: The
public interest in proceeding with the suit or petition must be balanced
against the extent to which allowing the suit or petition would interfere
with the duties of the official.
D. A Summary of Supreme CourtAnalyses.

The above Supreme Court opinions assist in exploring the merits of
the electoral recall systems in California and Washington. First, the
90.Id. at 571.
91. Id. at 575.
92. 177 F.2d 579 (2d. Cir. 1949).
93. Barr, 360 U.S. at 571.
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Supreme Court supports the concept of electoral recall 94 and generally
presumes the constitutionality of such state provisions. 95 Second, while
the Court recognizes that the principles behind measures of direct
democracy can be important governmental interests, the Court may strike
down those provisions if they infringe on fundamental rights such as
those provided in the First Amendment. 96 Third, the Court may be more
skeptical of judicial interference with executive duties if there are no
procedural safeguards in place-such as summary judgment or
heightened pleading requirements-that help to filter out "politically
motivated harassing and frivolous litigation." 97 The following sections
apply the parameters established by the Supreme Court to both the
California and Washington recall systems as a way of illustrating the
weaknesses of the California system while highlighting how
Washington's recall system has avoided these flaws.
IV. RECALL IN CALIFORNIA AND WASHINGTON STATE

The amendments to the state constitution that took place in the
1970s relegated most of the specifics of California's recall procedures to
the California Elections Code. 98 The signature-gathering requirements of
the Elections Code are unconstitutional under Buckley, and the Elections
Code does nothing to prevent undue harassment of elected officials. This
messy statutory arrangement begs for reform.
A. The Signature GatheringRequirements in the CaliforniaElection
Code Violate the FirstAmendment.
The signature-gathering requirement of the California Elections
Code infringes on the signature gatherers' right to political expression.
Section 11045 of the Elections Code requires that signature gatherers be
registered voters. 99 This requirement resembles the Colorado requirement
struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Buckley v. American
Constitutional Law Foundation. 00 In Buckley, the Court held that a
Colorado statute requiring signature gatherers to be registered voters

94. See Republican Party of Hawaii v. Mink, 474 U.S. 1301, 1301-02 (1985); Gutierrez v.
Ada, 528 U.S. 250, 251-53 (2000).
95. Mink, 474 U.S. at 1302.

96. Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Fdn., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 187 (1999).
97. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 708 (1997); see also Barr, 360 U.S. at 565.
98. GRODIN, supra note 22, at 75.
99. "Only registered voters of the electoral jurisdiction of the officer sought to be recalled are
qualified to circulate or sign a recall petition for that officer." CAL. ELEC. CODE § 11045.
100. 525 U.S. at 187.
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violated the First Amendment.' 0' In striking down the Colorado statute,
the Court reasoned that not registering to vote can be a form of political
expression and that by placing limitations on that expression, the
Colorado law violated the First Amendment. 0 2 While it might be argued
that this requirement makes recalls more difficult to initiate and helps
protect elected officials from harassment, the Buckley Court specifically
recognized how easy it is to become a registered voter. 103 Because
registering to vote is not a significant obstacle, the signature-gathering
requirement does not serve to protect elected officials from harassing
recall attempts and merely infringes on the fundamental rights protected
by the First Amendment.
Abstaining from registering to vote is as much a form of political
expression in California as it is in Colorado. Furthermore, the
justifications offered in defense of the Colorado statute-promoting
administrative efficiency, informing voters, and "polic[ing] lawbreakers
among petition circulators" by ensuring that the "circulators will be
amenable to the Secretary of State's subpoena power"-are as
unpersuasive when applied to the recall provisions of the California
Elections Code as they were when applied to Colorado's initiative
process in Buckley. 10 4 Therefore, if challenged, courts will likely find that
section 11045 of the Election Code violates the First Amendment.
Nevertheless, even if California's requirement that signature
gatherers be registered citizens is unconstitutional, it is unlikely that
courts would strike down California's entire recall system on that basis
alone. In Partnoy v. Shelley, one of the many cases surrounding the
recent recall of Governor Davis, 0 5 the plaintiffs alleged that California's
recall system was unconstitutional 106 because of a provision of the
Elections Code that required voters to cast their opinion on the issue of
the recall before voting for a successor candidate. 0 7 The district court
applied strict scrutiny to the statute and found it unconstitutional. 10 8 The
Partnoy Court reasoned that forcing voters to participate in the recall in
order to later vote for a succeeding governor limited the voters' right to
101. Id. The statute found to violate the First Amendment in Buckley required that "[n]o
section of a petition for any initiative or referendum measure shall be circulated by any person who
is not a registered elector and at least eighteen years of age at the time the section is circulated."
COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-112 (1998).
102. Buckley, 525 U.S. at 195-96.
103. Id. at 195.
104. Id. at 192, 196.
105. 277 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (S.D. Cal. 2003).
106. Id. at 1071.
107. "No vote cast in the recall election shall be counted for any candidate unless the voter also
voted for or against the recall of the officer sought to be recalled." CAL. ELEC. CODE § 11382.
108. Partnoy,277 F. Supp. 2d at 1075, 1079.
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free expression because the First Amendment protects "both the right to
speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all." '09
Nevertheless, on rehearing, the Court found that this section was
severable from the rest of the recall provisions because the provision was
"grammatically, functionally, and volitionally separable," '' ° and there
was "no reason to believe that the California voters did not want the
remaining recall procedure in the absence of section 11382."'I Likewise,
while a court would probably find the voter registration requirement in
section 11045 to be unconstitutional, it would also deem this provision
severable from the rest of the recall scheme. Nevertheless, while the
unconstitutional nature of section 11045 is not fatal to the entire recall
system because of its severability, this constitutional conflict exhibits the
need for reform to take into account the modem understanding of the
proper breadth of direct-democracy mechanisms.
B. California'sConstitutionalRecall ProvisionsMake Elected Officers
More Susceptible to HarassmentBecause They Prohibitthe Judiciary
from Determining the Sufficiency of a Recall Petition.
The signature-gathering requirements of section 11045 are likely
unconstitutional because they infringe fundamental rights protected by
the First Amendment, but the California Legislature should not stop by
merely remedying these defects in the Election Code. Rather, the
Legislature should take this opportunity to amend the constitutional
provisions relating to recall. 112 Only an amendment of the California
Constitution can reform California's recall system so that it adequately
protects elected officials from harassment. Because Washington's recall
system avoids these major problems, drafters of California's amendment
should use Washington's system as a model.
As currently formulated, the constitutional provisions in need of
reform are in Article II, sections 13 to 19 of the California State
Constitution. Article 11 defines recall as "the power of the electors to
remove an elected officer." '" 3 Recalling a statewide elected official under
California's constitution requires: 1)a petition alleging the reason for the

recall, the sufficiency of which cannot be reviewed; 2) that such petition
109. Id. at 1078 (quoting Wooley v.Maynard,430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977)).
110. Id. at 1081 (quoting Valley Outdoor, Inc. v. County of Riverside, No. 02-55475, slip op.
8539, 8540 (9th Cir. Aug. 1, 2003)).
111.
Ild.at 1087.
112. The California Constitution establishes the procedure for amending its constitution. CAL.
CONST. art. IIX. A vote by two-thirds of each house of the state legislature is necessary to propose a
constitutional amendment. Id. § 1.Such a proposal must be approved by a majority of voters. Id. § 2.
Alternatively, voters may amend the constitution through the initiative process. Id. § 3.
113. CAL. CONST.art. II, § 13.
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have the signatures of at least 12 percent of electors who voted in the
previous election for the office; and 3) that the signatures from at least
five counties equal 1 percent of the last vote for the office in the
county. 1 4 The California Constitution specifically permits recall of the
Governor, and assigns specific duties to various government officials if
such a recall occurs. 1 5 However, it specifically prohibits
any review of
6
1
recall.
the
to
rise
giving
charges
the
of
the sufficiency
1. The Recall Provisions of the California Constitution Need Revision to
Reflect the Priorities Expressed by the Supreme Court.
The primary problem with the California Constitution's recall
provisions is its low standard for initiating recalls. Because the Election
Code does not heighten these standards, the recall provisions allow for
substantial harassment of elected officials. Consider Clinton v. Jones, in
which the United States Supreme Court considered the substantial
safeguards in civil litigation that help prevent harassing or frivolous
litigation. 117 Precisely because the legal safeguards were already in place
to protect the President from harassment, the Supreme Court allowed
litigation to proceed that might have seemed to interfere with the
President's executive duties." 18 Just as the federal constitution gives the
President specific executive duties,' 'the California Constitution gives
the Governor specific executive duties. 20 It would be difficult to argue
that provisions of the California Constitution, such as those prohibiting
the courts from reviewing the sufficiency of a recall petition, 121
114. Section 14, "Recall Petitions," provides the following:

(a) Recall of a State officer is initiated by delivering to the Secretary of State a petition alleging
reason for recall. Sufficiency of reason is not reviewable. Proponents have 160 days to file
signed petitions.
(b) A petition to recall a statewide officer must be signed by electors equal in number to 12
percent of the last vote for the office, with signatures from each of 5 counties equal in number
to 1 percent of the last vote for the office in the county. Signatures to recall Senators, members
of the assembly, members of the Board of Equalization, and judges of courts of appeal and trial
courts must equal in number 20 percent of the last vote for the office.
(c) The Secretary of State shall maintain a continuous count of the signatures certified to that
office.

Id. § 14.
115. "If recall of the Governor or Secretary of State is initiated, the recall duties of that office
shall be performed by the Lieutenant Governor or Controller, respectively." CAL. CONST. art. II, §
17.
116. CAL. CONST. art. 11, § 14(a) ("Sufficiency of reason is not reviewable.").
117. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 708 (1997).
118. Id.
119. U.S. CONST. art If, § 2.

120. "The supreme executive power of this State is vested in the Governor. The Governor shall
see that the law is faithfully executed." CAL. CONST. art. V, § I.
121. CAL. CONST. art. It, § 14.
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unconstitutionally violate the separation-of-powers doctrine so
thoroughly described in Clinton. Nonetheless, California's relaxed
approach toward recall does not strike a proper balance of policy
considerations behind its recall measures. This approach fails to protect
the executive official to the extent the Supreme Court suggested is
necessary in 22order to ensure that the recall does not inhibit executive
functioning. 1

Although the recall of statewide elected officials is a relatively rare
occurrence, the mere potential for recall can interfere with the duties of
officials. Proponents of California's current recall system have argued
that the recall mechanism does not pose a serious threat of harassment to
elected officials and does not interfere with government functioning
because the constituents are responsible enough to know when a recall is
necessary. This argument is supported by the fact that Governor Davis's
recall election was the
first successful gubernatorial recall election in
23
California's history.1

However, while Davis was the first of California's governors to
have been actually recalled, there have been thirty-one previous attempts
to recall California governors.' 24 Each of these attempts likely interfered
with the governor's effectiveness, as well as with the functioning of the
executive branch. Moreover, the precedent set by Davis's recall, that
unpopularity is sufficient grounds for a recall, 125 will likely lead to
26
Californians using the recall mechanism with increased frequency.'
Furthermore, this precedent will undoubtedly put increased pressure on
future governors to maintain popularity to avoid a recall thereby
distracting the officials from their executive duties. In addition,
developments in modern communication technology will likely make the
signature-gathering requirements easier to satisfy, 127 resulting in an
increased potential for harassment of elected officials. Because

122. See Clinton, 520 U.S. at 708; Barrv. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564, 565 (1959).
123. CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE KEVIN SHELLEY: FAQs ABOUT RECALLS (2003), at
http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/electionsrecallfaqs.htm#20 (last visited July 10, 2004).
124. Id.
125. In June 2003, while the recall movement was gathering steam, Governor Davis's approval
rating was at twenty-one percent. Gov. Gray Davis: Keeping His Eye on the Job (Jun. 26, 2003), at

http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/06/26/cnna.davis/.
126. For example, a petition to recall Governor Schwarzenegger is already circulating in
California. This petition can be viewed at http://www.petitiononline.com/calgov/petition.html (last
visited July 10, 2004).
127. Besides the intemet petitions calling for the recall of Governor Schwarzenegger, there are
several Internet sites promoting such a recall. See, e.g., http://www.recallarnie.com/ (last visited July
10, 2004); http://www.helpcalifomia.info/ (last visited July 10, 2004); http://www.codepinkalert.org/
CodePinkVigil Information AmoldProtest.html
(last
visited
July
10,
2004);
http://www.realseduction.com/ra index.htm (last visited July 10, 2004).
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approximately nine million people voted in the recall election, 128a
petition of only about one million persons 129 of the approximately 15
million registered voters in California 30 would be necessary to force
another recall election.
Proponents of California's recall system may also argue that the
United States Supreme Court's decisions in Clinton and Barr are not
relevant to the recall issue because recall is a process initiated by the
people, not a governmental branch, and thus recall should not be subject
to a separation-of-powers analysis. This argument is without merit for
multiple reasons. First, the recall process in California does raise
separation-of-powers concerns because it involves two branches of
government; the legislature must certify a recall petition against a
member of the executive branch.13 1 As with the initiation of a recall, the
initiation of a lawsuit could be considered an execution of a power
inherent in the people. However, the Supreme Court in Clinton v. Jones
specifically recognized that judicial involvement with such a suit,
regardless of the individuals who initiated it, raised the separation-ofpowers issue. 132 Similarly, although individuals initiate a recall, the
California Legislature must certify it. Therefore, it is necessary to
consider the relationship between the legislative and executive branches
in California when determining the validity of the recall process. Second,
even if California's recall process were not directly submitted to a
separation-of-powers analysis, the principles enunciated in Clinton and
Barr relating to protection of elected officials from harassment... remain
relevant considerations in reforming California's recall process.
A more colorable but ultimately hollow argument against recall
reform is that any restrictions on the recall process would usurp the
inherent power of California's citizens. As the argument goes, because
power is inherent in the people, voters should be able to exercise their
recall rights even if such an exercise of power interferes with
government functioning or constitutes harassment of the duties of one

128. ELECTION RESULTS,
visited July 10, 2004).

at http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/elections-elections.htm

(last

129. A successful recall petition in California must have the signatures of 12 percent of voters
who voted in the last election for the office subject to the recall. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 14.
Approximately one million signatures equals 12 percent of the nine million voters who participated
in Davis's recall election.
130. CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE KEVIN SHELLEY: REPORT OF REGISTRATION (2004),

at http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/ror/regstats 01-02-04.pdf (last visited July 10, 2004).
131. "The Legislature shall provide for circulation, filing, and certification of petitions,
nomination of candidates, and the recall election." CAL. CONST. art. I1,§ 16.
132. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 705--06 (1997).
133. Id. at 708; Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564, 565 (1959).
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governmental branch. 134 Even before the populist reforms of the
twentieth century, the concept that political power is inherent in the
people was well established. For example, James Madison said that
"[t]he people were in fact, the fountain of all power, and by resorting to
them, all difficulties were got over.' 35 While this inherent power is well
acknowledged, "[e]ven the most ardent supporters of popular sovereignty
acknowledge that majority rule is not the same as majority will and
certainly not the same as majority whim." ' 136 Accordingly, normally
scheduled elections are the proper way to express the inherent power of
the people. There is a strong state interest in holding elections at the
scheduled times except in the most egregious circumstances. 137 Regularly
planned elections support the legitimacy of the government and do not
undermine the inherent power of the people. Rather, regular elections
further the inherent power by legitimizing it.' 38 The Supreme Court in
Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections stated that "the political
franchise of voting [is a] fundamental political right . . .because [it is]
preservative of all rights.... [Because] the right to exercise the franchise
in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and
political rights, any alleged infringement of the right to vote of citizens
must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized."'' 39 If recall proliferates
as a method of expressing political disappointments, such a mechanism
will dilute the potency of the electoral process and reduce the legitimacy
of elected officials. Such a consequence infringes on the basic right to
vote and the fundamental rights flowing from that basic right.
Overall, the California recall process is marred in confusion and
questions of constitutionality. Moreover, the recall process fails to
achieve any sort of balance between the purposes behind recall and the
dangers recall presents. Instead, the current recall process opens the door
for harassment of political figures and interference with their official
duties. Although California's low standards for initiating a recall
134. The Progressives, in support of the adoption of direct democracy in Califoria,
emphasized a provision of the former California constitution that "[a]ll political power is inherent in
the people." CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 2 (repealed 1980); GRODIN, supra note 22, at 17. The current
California Constitution retains this concept of power: "All political power is inherent in the people.
Govermment is instituted for their protection, security, and benefit, and they have the right to alter or
reform it when the public good may require." CAL. CONST. art. I1,
§ 1.
135. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 476 (Max Farrand ed., 1937)

(quoting Madison).
136. Vikram David Amar, Adventures in Direct Democracy: The Top Ten Constitutional
Lessonsfrom the CaliforniaRecall Experience, 92 CAL. L. REV. 927, 949 (2004).
137. Id. at 951.
138. Id. at 942.
139. 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (internal quotation marks omitted); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
561-62 (1964)).
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promote the principles of direct democracy, such standards also
potentially undermine the saliency of the electoral system by allowing
harassment of elected officials. The fact that there is no judicial review
of the recall claims is a major flaw in the current process. Constituents
can recall any elected official for any reason, as long as enough
signatures appear on the petitions. This low threshold for recall petitions
is not difficult to meet in a state as populous as California. Fortunately,
the balancing of interests necessary to reform the system is not difficult.
California should consider the models of recall offered by other states
when determining how to revise their provisions. Washington provides
an excellent example of a recall regime that strikes the optimal balance
between the policy considerations behind recall and the threats to
political stability in the recall process.
2. The Washington Recall Provisions Have Stricter Standards Than
Those in California and Do Not Suffer from
Similar Constitutional Defects.
In 1912, Washington added Amendment 8 to its constitution, which
included a provision for recall. 40 Article I, section 33 of the Washington
Constitution provides the requirements for the recall of elected officers.
This provision requires a recall petition to allege that the officer "has
committed some act or acts of malfeasance or misfeasance while in
office or has violated his oath of office.' 14 ' Article 1, section 34 gives the
Washington Legislature the authority to enact laws to carry out the
provisions of section 33 and establishes the requirements for recall
petitions. Specifically, section 34 requires that petitions be signed by 25
percent of electors (compared to 12 percent in California) computed from
the total number of votes cast for that office in the preceding election for
the recall of various highly placed state officers, senators, and

140. UTTER, supra note 34, at 46.
141. Article 1, section 33 of the Washington Constitution provides the following:

Every elective public officer of the state of Washington except judges of courts of record is
subject to recall and discharge by the legal voters of the state, or of the political subdivision of
the state, from which he was elected whenever a petition demanding his recall, reciting that
such officer has committed some act or acts of malfeasance or misfeasance while in office, or
who has violated his oath of office, stating the matters complained of, signed by the
percentages of the qualified electors thereof, hereinafter provided, the percentage required to
be computed from the total number of votes cast for all candidates for his said office to which
he was elected at the preceding election, is filed with the officer with whom a petition for
nomination, or certificate for nomination, to such office must be filed under the laws of this
state, and the same officer shall call a special election as provided by the general election laws
of this state, and the result determined as therein provided.
WASH. CONST. art. 1,§ 33.
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representatives. For all other42 elected officials, the percentage of
signatories must be 35 percent. 1
Washington courts have defined their role in the recall process well.
One year after the enactment of the recall provision, in Cudihee v.
Phelps,143 the Washington Supreme Court first interpreted this provision.
Cudihee involved the recall of a King County sheriff. 144 The plaintiff
argued that the court should enjoin the county auditor from taking action
on the recall petition until a court had determined the truth of the
allegations in the recall.145 The Cudihee court held that, while it may
have the power to review the sufficiency of the "statement of the
allegations made as a cause for removal," the ultimate question of
"whether such cause actually exists ... and ... whether the officer shall
be discharged, shall be had before the tribunal of the people."' 146 This
general principle that the court may review the sufficiency of the recall
petition as to the allegations of "malfeasance or misfeasance" and
violations of the "oath of office," 147 but not as to the truth of the
allegations, has remained constant
in judicial interpretation of the
48
mechanism.
recall
Washington
For a brief period in the 1960s and early 1970s, there was a trend to
liberally construe the constitutional standards for recall by equating

142. Article 1, section 34 of the Washington Constitution provides the following:
The legislature shall pass the necessary laws to carry out the provisions of Section thirty-three
(33) of this article, and to facilitate its operation and effect without delay: Provided, That the
authority hereby conferred upon the legislature shall not be construed to grant to the legislature
any exclusive power of lawmaking nor in any way limit the initiative and referendum powers
reserved by the people. The percentages required shall be, state officers, other than judges,
senators and representatives, city officers of cities of the first class, school district boards in
cities of the first class; county officers of counties of the first, second and third classes, twentyfive per cent. Officers of all other political subdivisions, cities, towns, townships, precincts and
school districts not herein mentioned, and state senators and representatives, thirty-five per
cent.
WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 34.
143.76 Wash. 314, 136 P. 367 (1913).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 330, 136 P. at 373; Note, G.V.T., Recall of Public Officers: Discretionary Acts
CannotBe a Sufficient Basisfor Recall, 48 WASH. L. REv. 503 (1973).
146. Cudihee, 76 Wash. at 331.
147. WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 33.
148. See, e.g., Bocek v. Bayley, 81 Wash. 2d 831, 835, 505 P.2d 814, 817 (1973) (finding that
"in determining the validity of recall charges, courts are limited to examination of the charges stated
and cannot inquire into factual matters extraneous to the allegations" and that "courts must assume
the truth of the charges in determining whether legally sufficient grounds for recall have been
stated.") (quoting State ex. Rel. Citizens Against Mandatory Bussing [sic] v. Brooks, 80 Wash. 2d
121, 124-25, 492 P.2d 536 (1972); In re Recall Charges Against Feetham, 149 Wash. 2d 860, 873,
72 P.3d 741, 747 (2003) (finding that the court's review of a recall petition is "only for a prima facie
case, not for the truth of the charges.").
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"malfeasance" with any wrongful act. 149 However, in Cole v. Webster the
court explicitly rejected this reasoning in favor of a heightened standard
that "is consistent with the original intent of the framers of the
constitution's recall provision" and frees "public officials from the
harassment of recall elections grounded on frivolous charges or mere
insinuations." 150 In Cole, the Washington Supreme Court recognized
what the California recall process ignores: that the recall system must
achieve a delicate balance between the purposes of recall and the
potential interference with the duties of elected officials. Accordingly,
the court held that the judiciary must "review the sufficiency of [recall]
charges as a matter of law and decide whether the facts, if true, establish
a prima facie act of misfeasance, malfeasance, or a violation of the oath
51
of office" in order to go forward with a recall election.'
The Washington Legislature has embraced and codified the
principle of judicial review of recall petitions. 152 In 1984, the legislature
amended the recall provisions to require that the petitioner "verify under
oath that he or she has knowledge of the alleged facts upon which the
state grounds for recall are based."' 153 The recent amendments to the
recall statute retained this requirement. 154 Both the 1984 and 2004
149. G.V.T., supra note 145, at 508-09; Michael L. Cohen, Recall in Washington: A Time for
Reform, 50 WASH. L. REV. 29,41 (1974).
150. 103 Wash. 2d 280, 283, 288, 692 P.2d 799, 802, 804 (1984) (overruling Danielson v.
Faymonville, 72 Wash. 2d 854, 435 P.2d 963 (1967); State ex rel. LaMon v. Westport, 73 Wash. 2d
255, 438 P.2d 200 (1968); State ex. Rel. Citizens Against Mandatory Bussing [sic] v. Brooks, 80
Wash. 2d 121, 492 P.2d 536 (1972); Bocek v. Bayley, 81 Wash. 2d 831, 505 P.2d 814 (1973)).
151. 103 Wash. 2d at 288.
152. WASH. REV. CODE § 29.82.010 (1984).
153. Chandler v.Otto, 103 Wash. 2d 268, 272, 693 P.2d 71, 73 (1984); § 29.82.010.
154. The most recent recall statute provides the following:
Whenever any legal voter of the state or of any political subdivision thereof, either individually
or on behalf of an organization, desires to demand the recall and discharge of any elective
public officer of the state or of such political subdivision, as the case may be, under the
provisions of sections 33 and 34 of Article I of the Constitution, the voter shall prepare a
typewritten charge, reciting that such officer, naming him or her and giving the title of the
office, has committed an act or acts of malfeasance, or an act or acts of misfeasance while in
office, or has violated the oath of office, or has been guilty of any two or more of the acts
specified in the Constitution as grounds for recall. The charge shall state the act or acts
complained of in concise language, give a detailed description including the approximate date,
location, and nature of each act complained of, be signed by the person or persons making the
charge, give their respective post office addresses, and be verified under oath that the person or
persons believe the charge or charges to be true and have knowledge of the alleged facts upon
which the stated grounds for recall are based." For the purposes of this chapter: (I)
"Misfeasance" or "malfeasance" in office means any wrongful conduct that affects, interrupts,
or interferes with the performance of official duty; (a) Additionally, "misfeasance" in office
means the performance of a duty in an improper manner; and (b) Additionally, "malfeasance"
in office means the commission of an unlawful act; (2) "Violation of the oath of office" means
the neglect or knowing failure by an elective public officer to perform faithfully a duty
imposed by law.
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versions of the statute define "misfeasance" or "malfeasance" as
wrongful conduct that "affects, interrupts, or interferes" with an official
duty. "Misfeasance" is the performance of an official duty "in an
improper manner," while "malfeasance" is "the commission of an
unlawful act."'' 5 5 "[V]iolation of the oath of office" is the "neglect or
knowing failure by an elected public officer to perform faithfully a duty
imposed by law."' 56 Accordingly, unlike California, mere unpopularity is
not enough in Washington to serve as the basis for a recall.
In Chandler v. Otto, the court found that these revisions were
specifically designed to "allow recall for cause yet free public officials
from the harassment of recall elections grounded on frivolous charges or
mere insinuations" and to require recall petitions to be "both legally and
factually sufficient."'' 57 The most recent recall opinion in Washington
affirmed this decision. Charges are factually sufficient if they "state
sufficient facts to identify to the electors and to the official being recalled
acts or failure to act which without justification would constitute a prima
facie showing of misfeasance, malfeasance, or a violation of the oath of
office.' ' 158 In addition, the court defined 'legal sufficiency' as "that the
petitioner allege a prima facie case of misfeasance, malfeasance, or
59
violation of the oath of office without justification." 1
While the Washington standards for recall of elected officers are
strict, such standards have not prevented voters from using their right to
recall. For example, in a case of a petition to recall the Pierce County
Auditor, the petitioner argued that the court should grant the recall on
two charges. 160 The first charge alleged the commission of perjury or
"false swearing" while in office and the second charge alleged
misconduct regarding a statewide referendum on a new professional
football stadium.16' The court found that the misconduct charge was not a
legally sufficient basis for recall because the action in question was "a
reasonable discretionary act."' 162 However, the court also found that the
"false swearing" charge was both factually and legally sufficient,
because, if true, it was an illegal act and thus "an adequate basis for a
recall charge." 163 Thus, despite the relatively high standards of the
WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.56.1 10 (effective July 1, 2004) (replacing § 29.82.010).
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id.
Id.
103 Wash. 2d at 274, 693 P.2d at 74.
In re Recall Charges Against Feetham, 149 Wash. 2d 860, 864-65, 72 P.3d 741, 743

(2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
159. Id. at 865.
160. In re Recall ofPearsall-Stipek, 141 Wash. 2d 756, 761, 10 P.3d 1034, 1038 (2000).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 783.
163. Id. at 782.
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Washington recall, the courts have not denied the voters of Washington
their right to recall elected officials
who have committed acts
64
inconsistent with their duties of office.'
The Washington framework for electoral recall provides a
reasonable methodology for filtering out recall petitions that are designed
to harass and interfere with elected officials. By examining the factual
and legal sufficiency of a recall petition, the Washington courts play a
similar role to that prescribed under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted 65 requires that courts only dismiss a complaint if "the plaintiff
can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him
to relief."' 166 A recall system should not hold a petition for recall to any
lower standard, especially when the petition has the potential to seriously
interfere with the constitutionally prescribed duties of an elected official.
Washington's "factually sufficient" and "legally sufficient" requirements
necessarily hold recall petitions to the same standard of sufficiency as
other litigation. 67 This is consistent with the principles the United States
Supreme Court has laid down in Clinton v. Jones and Barr v. Matteo.
V. CONCLUSION
In considering issues of electoral recall, states must balance two
competing interests: the populist interest in promoting government
accountability and voter participation' 68 and the governmental interest in
preventing harassment of elected officials and ensuring that such
officials can effectively carry out the duties of their offices.169 California
voters have recently used electoral recall to remove Governor Gray
Davis from office. This recall was successful in the absence of any
showing of wrongdoing by Davis because under California recall law,
the recall petition was not required to state any reason for the recall and
the California Constitution specifically prohibits the courts from

164. Other recent examples of successful recall petitions include the following: Feetham, 149

Wash. 2d at 873 (holding that two of the three charges in the recall petition were both factually and
legally sufficient); In re Recall of Kast, 144 Wash. 2d 807, 819, 31 P.3d 677, 683 (2001) (holding

that one of two charges in the recall petition was sufficient, and thus the recall process should go
forward); Matter of Lee, 122 Wash. 2d 613, 619, 859 P.2d 1244, 1248 (1993) (finding charges to be
sufficient and that the recalled officer "will have the opportunity to defend herself during the
electoral process").
165. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
166. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45 (1957).
167. See In re Recall of Sandhaus, 134 Wash. 2d 662, 668, 953 P.2d 82, 85 (1998).
168. BEARD, supra note 10, at 52.
169. See generally Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997); see also Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S.
564, 565 (1959).
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examining the adequacy of the recall petition. 170 In fact, the only
adequacy requirement for the petition was a signature-gathering
requirement. 171 However, this requirement is so low that it would be
unlikely to prevent anyone with adequate funds and motivation from
initiating a recall against any elected official. 172 These signature
requirements are even less likely to provide any sort of meaningful check
on the recall process in a state as large and as politically diverse as
California. Because of this low standard, the California recall system
allows petitions to go forward, even though the recall is intended solely
for harassment or for furtherance of political goals, and even if such
petitions will severely impinge the elected official's ability to perform on
the job. When the elected official's duties are constitutionally mandated,
such impingement is especially problematic.173 Moreover, some of these
provisions are marred with constitutional difficulties. 174 For these
reasons, the California Legislature should amend both the California
Constitution 175 and the California Elections Code electoral recall
76
provisions. 1
In revising its electoral recall system to more adequately protect
elected officials from harassment, California should adopt Washington's
178
model. 177 Washington's system uses stricter signature requirements
and requires the courts to review the recall petition to determine whether
the petition's allegations that the officer has committed "some act or acts
of malfeasance or misfeasance while in office or. . . has violated his oath
of office"' 179 are both legally and factually sufficient. 180 While this model
heightens the requirements for a recall petition above the standard in
California, it does not prevent the people from exercising their right to
recall for meaningful purposes. 181 Thus, this model more adequately
170. CAL. CONST. art. 11, § 14.
171. Id.

172. Only 12 percent of voters in the previous election for the same office need sign the
petition in order for it to be sufficient. Id.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
1, 2004).

See Clinton, 520 U.S. at685.
See, e.g.,
CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 11045, 11382.
CAL. CONST. art. II,§§ 14-18.
CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 11000-11386.
WASH. CONsr. art. 1, §§ 33-34; WASH. REV. CODE §§ 29A.56.110-84.240 (effective July

178. Either 25 percent or 35 percent of voters from the last election, depending on the office
involved, are required for a recall petition to be sufficient in Washington. Id. § 34.
179. Id. § 33.
180. In re Recall of Sandhaus, 134 Wash. 2d 662, 668, 953 P.2d 82, 85 (1998).
181. See, e.g.,
In re Recall Charges Against Feetham, 149 Wash. 2d 860, 873, 72 P.3d 741, 747
(2003); In re Recall of Kast, 144 Wash. 2d 807, 819, 31 P.3d 677, 683 (2001); Matter of Lee, 122
Wash.2d 613, 619, 859 P.2d 1244, 1248 (1993).
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balances the purposes behind the recall mechanism and the dangers to
efficient and functional government that such a mechanism presents.

